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Abstract:
In this paper we study situations where agents who are dividedin hierarchicalclasses have
restricted possibilities for communication. We introduce a class of allocation rules for
these situations inspired by the Myerson value (Myerson (1977)) and Shapley values with
weight systems (Kalai and Samet (1988)). It is shown that this new class of allocation
rules can be characterized by a consistency property, a fairness criterion, a property
based on the hierarchy among the agents, and an eciency criterion. Furthermore, we
show that the consistency property can be dropped from the axiomatic characterization
when the fairness criterion is strengthened.
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11 Introduction
Communication situations are situations in which the agents in a cooperative game have
restricted communication possibilities. Myerson (1977) studied communication situa-
tions where all players are equally powerful. For these situations he introduced graph-
restricted games and he characterized the Myerson value, dened as the Shapley value of
the graph-restricted game, using eciency and fairness. Commmunication situations are
studied extensively in the literature since ( see Nouweland (1993) and Borm, Nouweland
and Tijs (1994) for detailed surveys on games with communication restrictions).
Communication situations have a number of interesting applications. However, the
solution concepts in the literature cannot be used to study situations in which there is
a hierarchy among the agents.
An example of a communication situation with a hierarchical structure appears in the
relation between the stockholders of a rm. The asymmetry between the stockholders is
evident when one considers large (institutional) stockholders and small (private) stock-
holders. Furthermore one can consider the airline industry, in which there is a growing
number of explicit cooperation agreements. This implies that a certain airline company
will sometimes represent itself, while at some other time it will be represented by a form
of cooperation. A third example appears in Dutch soccer. The teams in the leagues and
the national soccer association have to divide the money that television stations pay for
the right to broadcast soccer games. The asymmetry between the teams is a result from
the dierence in popularity of the teams. While some teams attract a lot of viewers,
others will only attract a few. A more theoretical example can be found in economic
organizations with a hierarchical structuring of economic agents. One can think of a
market where some agents take prices as given, while other agents set prices for certain
trade relations. A survey of these models can be found in Brink and Gilles (1994).
In this paper we model the asymmetry between the players by means of weight sys-
tems consisting of hierarchical classes and weights. Kalai and Samet (1988) introduced
weighted Shapley values with weight systems, a non-symmetric extension of the Shapley
value. We will proceed along the lines set by Myerson (1977) and Kalai and Samet (1988)
and dene an extension of the Myerson value,t h eMyerson value with weight system !
dened as the weighted Shapley value with weight system ! of the graph-restricted game.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we provide some denitions
and we introduce the Myerson value with weight system !. Then, in section 3 we provide
an axiomatic characterization of this rule using a consistency property, a fairness criteri-
on, a property based on the hierarchy among the agents, and an eciency criterion. In
section 4 we introduce a balanced contributions criterion and show that if we replace the
2fairness criterion by this balanced contributions criterion, we can drop the consistency
property in the axiomatic characterization of section 3. In the appendix we show that in
both characterizations the properties are logically independent. We conclude with some
remarks with respect to the introduction of a generalization of the position value (Borm,
Owen and Tijs (1992)) to communication situations with a hierarchical player partition.
2 Denitions
Let Ω be a universe of players. Throughout this paper we will assume a hierarchy
on the players in Ω given by a weak ordering (satisfying reﬂexivity, completeness and
transitivity). This ordering will be denoted by .
In this paper we will only consider nite sets of players N = f1;:::;ngΩ. The
hierarchical structure  on Ω imposes a partition of a player set N in hierarchical classes,
=( S 1;:::;S m), where S1 denotes the lowest class and Sm the highest one. Notice that
we use  to denote both the hierarchical ordering on Ω and the partition this structure
imposes on N.
Apart from the hierarchical structure there is a communication structure among the
agents. This structure is described by a (communication) graph (N;L)i nw h i c ht w o
players are linked i they can communicate directly. The economic possibilities of a
group of players are described by a TU-cooperative game (N;v). Our intrest in this paper
is to investigate the eect that a specic communication structure has on the economic
positions of the players. Therefore, we will consider communication situations (N;v;L),
where (N;v) denotes a TU-cooperative game and (N;L) denotes a (communication)
graph. We will denote the class of all communication situations with player set N by
CSN.
For any (N;v;L)a n da n ySN , the communication possibilities within coalition S
are exactly the links in the set L(S): =ffi;jg2Ljf i;jgS g . Hence, a coalition S is
split into communication components as follows: T  S is a communication component
if and only if the graph (T;L(T)) is connected and there exists no strict superset T 0,
T  T 0  S,w i t h( T 0;L(T0)) connected. We will denote the resulting partition of S by
S=L.
In order to capture dierences in the relative positions of agents, Kalai and Samet
(1988) introduced weight systems. A weight system ! is a pair (;) with  2 IR
Ω
++ as e t
of weights and  the hierarchical ordering on Ω. Now dene for all nite N  Ω, S  N
the set S as follows: let k := maxfj j Sj \ S 6= ;g and S := S \ Sk.S o ,Sdenotes the
3set of players of S in the highest hierarchical class that is represented in S. For every
unanimity game (N;uS), dened by uS(T)=1,i fST,a n du S( T)=0 otherwise, the
weighted Shapley value with weight system !, !, assigns to the players of S an amount







j 2 S j ,i fi2S
0 , otherwise
:
Harsanyi (1959) showed that every characteristic function can be written in exactly one





called the dividends of the game (N;v). The weighted Shapley value with weight system










i( u S) :
With a communication situation (N;v;L) we can dene the graph-restricted game





Myerson (1977) denes the Myerson value of a communication situation (N,v,L)a st h e
Shapley value of the game (N;vL). Analogously we dene the Myerson value with weight
system ! of the communication situation (N;v;L) as the weighted Shapley value with





Consider the weight system ! = ((1;:::;1);(N)). The weighted Shapley value with
weight system ! of a game coincides with the Shapley value of this game. Therefore,
the Myerson value with weight system ! of a communication situation coincides with
the Myerson value of this communication situation. Hence, the Myerson value belongs
to the class of Myerson values with weight systems, so, our denition of Myerson values
with weight systems is an extension of the denition of Myerson (1977).
3 Axiomatic characterization using consistency
In this section we will give an axiomatic characterization of the class of Myerson values
with weight systems. This characterization involves a consistency property and three
4other axioms, component eciency, class weighted fairness and higher class indepen-
dency.
We consider a nite player set N  Ωa n dt h ec l a s sCSN of all communication situa-
tions with player set N. An allocation rule γ is a function on fCSN jN Ω;Nniteg
that assigns to every (N;v;L) 2 CSN, N nite, a vector γ(N;v;L) 2 IR
N . When there
is no ambiguity about the underlying game (N;v) we will simply write γ(L) instead of
γ(N;v;L). Examples of allocation rules are the Myerson values with weight systems and
the position value (see Borm, Owen and Tijs (1992)).
We introduce some properties for an allocation rule γ:
Component eciency (CE) : For all nite N  Ω, all communication situations




γi(L)=v ( S ) :
Class weighted fairness (CWF) : There exist weights  =(  i ) i 2 Ωsuch that for
all nite N  Ω, all communication situations (N;v;L) 2 CSN, all hierarchical













Component eciency states that the value of a component is divided between the play-
ers that form the component. Class weighted fairness states that when we compare a
communication situation with the situation that results when we delete a link between
two players in the same hierarchical class, then the weighted dierences in payo for
these two players are equal.
To prove that Myerson values with weight systems satisfy component eciency and
class weighted fairness we use three of the properties Kalai and Samet (1988) use to
characterize the weighted Shapley values with weight systems, additivity,t h edummy
player property and partnership consistency.
First we note that ! satises additivity, i.e. !(N;v + w)= !( N;v)+ !( N;w)
for all (N;v)a n d( N;w).
Ap l a y e riin v is called a dummy player of the game (N;v)i f
v ( S[f i g )=v ( S ) for all S  Nnfig:
Now, ! has the dummy player property, i.e. !
i (N;v)=0i fiis a dummy player of the
game (N;v).
5A coalition S is called a partnership in (N;v) if for all T  S and all R  NnS,
v(R[T)=v ( R ). ! is partnership consistent, i.e. for every partnership S in (N;v)a n d











i 2 S !
i( N;v). Partnership consistency of ! states that if we reallo-
cate the total payo of a partnership according to !, then the players receive the same
payo before and after the reallocation.
In lemma 3.1 we will show that ! satises the properties component eciency and
class weighted fairness.
Lemma 3.1 The Myerson value with weight system ! satises CE and CWF.
Proof: F i r s tw ew i l lp r o v et h a t !satises CE. Let N  Ω be nite, (N;v;L) 2 CSN,
and S a communication component of (N;L). Split the game vL into two games vS and
vNnS, dened by
vS(T): =v L ( T \ S ) ;
v
N n S ( T ): =v
L ( T n S ) ;
for all T  N. Since S is a communication component of (N;L)i th o l d st h a tv L=
v S+ v N n S .
All players of S are dummy players in the game vNnS. From the dummy player
property of the weightedShapley value with weightsystem ! it follows that !
i (vNnS)=0
for all i 2 S (see Kalai and Samet (1988)). In the same way we can show that !
i (vS)=0





































L( S )=v ( S ) ;
w h e r ew eu s et h ef a c tt h a t !
i( v S) = 0 for all i 2 NnS in the fourth equality and the
eciency of ! in the fth equality.
Let ! =( ;), then we show that ! satises CWF with weights .L e t N Ω
be nite, (N;v;L) 2 CSN, k 2f 1 ;:::;mg,a n di;j 2 Sk. Dene L0 := Lnffi;jgg and










This implies that fi;jg is a partnership in v. The partnership consistency of the weight-



































































where the second and the fourth equality follow from the additivity of the weighted
Shapley value with weight system !.
2
Before we can introduce the next property, higher class independency, we rst need
some more denitions. First we dene for all k 2f 1 ;:::;mgthe set Lk of links that




Further we dene the constants (S)SN and (k






SuS, i.e. (S)SN and (k
S)SN are the dividends (see section 2) of vL
and vLk respectively. Now we can consider the next property.
Higher class independency (HCI) : For all nite N  Ω, every (N;v;L) 2 CSN,
and every i 2 N,i fi2S kthen γi(N;v;L)=γ i( N;v;Lk).
Higher class independency states that the payo of a player is not inﬂuenced by
breaking all the links in which a player of a higher class is involved. Lemma 3.2 shows
that the Myerson value with weight system ! satises higher class independency.
7Lemma 3.2 The Myerson value with weight system ! satises HCI.
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L  k( S ) :
Using the uniqueness of the dividends S and k
S, we obtain for all S [ k
r =1Sr that
S = k
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P
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X
S : i 2 S
 i
P






where the second equality uses the fact that if i 2 Sk then for all S with i 2 S it holds
that S [ k
r =1Sr.
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Before we can introduce the last property that completes our axiomatic characteriza-
tion of the Myerson values with weight systems, we need some more denitions.
Let N  Ω, N nite, and (N;v;L) 2 CSN be xed for the moment. First we dene
the set of links in L, in which no player in the lowest k classes is involved:
L
>k := ffi;jg2Lji;j 2[ m
r = k +1Srg:
The players in the highest m − k classes may be connected via players of the lowest k
classes. These connections are reﬂected in the set
L
k := ffi;jgji;j 2[
m
r = k +1Sr; and there exists a T [
k
r =1Sr;T6 = ;
such that (T [f i;jg;L ( T[f i;jg)) is connected g:





We are mainly interested in L1 and we will also indicate this set by L0.S o ,L 0denotes the
adjusted communication possibilities of the players when we leave out the lowest class.
Finally we dene a game (NnS1;w)w h e r ef o ra l lSNn S 1:w ( S): =v L( S[ S 1) − v L( S 1).
In lemma 3.3 we prove a relation between the characteristic functions w and wL0.
Lemma 3.3 Let N  Ω, N nite, and (N;v;L) 2 CSN. Then, it holds that w = wL0
.
8Proof: We have to show for all S  NnS1 that w(S)=w L 0( S ). Let S  NnS1. From
the denition of L0 it follows that for every T 2 S=L0 we can dene a C(T) such that
C(T)  S1=L and it holds that T [ C0(T) 2 (S [ S1)=L,w i t hC 0( T): =[ C 2 C ( T)C.T h i s
denition implies that C(T)=;if T 2 (S [ S1)=L.
We also can conclude from the denition of L0 that for all T1;T 22S=L0 with T1 6= T2,
C0(T1) \ C0(T2)=; , which states that T1 and T2 are in the original situation connected
with dierent components of the lowest class.
Using this we nd:
w(S)=v
L ( S [ S 1 ) − v
L ( S 1 )
=
X























where the third equality follows from the fact that every C 2 C(T) is a component in
the graph (S1;L(S 1)). Since for all T 2 S=L0 it holds that
P
C2C(T)v(C)=v L( C 0( T))
we can rewrite this last expression and obtain
X
T2S=L0



























where the second equality follows because the partition of T [ S1 in T [ C0(T)a n d
S 1 =C0(T) does not split up any component of (T [ S1;L) and the partition of S1 in
C0(T)a n dS 1n C 0( T) does not split up any component of (S1;L).
2
The dividends of the game (N;w) will be denoted by (S)SN,s ow=
P
S  N S u S.
A relation between these dividends and the dividends of the game (N;vL), (S)SN,i s
expressed in the following lemma.
9Lemma 3.4 Let N  Ω, N nite, and (N;v;L) 2 CSN. Then, for all T  NnS1 with
T 6= ;, T =
P
US1 T[U.
Proof: We will prove the lemma by induction to the number of elements of the set T.
If T = fig then
fig = w(fig)=v















Let T  NnS1 with jTj > 1. Suppose S =
P






S  T[ S 1
 S−
X
S  S 1
 S=
X
S  T[ S 1;S\T6=;
S:
From this and the induction hypothesis it follows that




























where the rst equality uses the fact that ; =0 .
2
Using lemma 3.4, we can prove the following statement with respect to the relation
between a sum of the dividends of the game (N;v) and a sum of the dividends of the
game (N;w):
Lemma 3.5 Let N  Ω, N nite, and (N;v;L) 2 CSN. Then, for all k 2f 2 ;:::;mg
























10where the second equality follows from lemma 3.4.
2
For the introduction of the property class consistency we dene the game (NnS1;z),
given an allocation rule γ. For every S  NnS1 dene
z(S): =v L( S[S 1)−
X
i 2 S 1
γ i( S[S 1;v;L):
The game (NnS1;z) is called the class-reduced game. The class-reduced game is a specic
example of the reduced games Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) use to characterize the Shapley
value. The value of a coalition S in the class-reduced game is dened as the worth of
the union of this coalition with the players of the lowest class in the graph-restricted
game minus the payo that the players of this lowest class would get if the player set was
restricted to S[S1. We will call the triple (NnS1;z;L 0)t h eclass-reduced communication
situation.
Class Consistency (CC) : For all nite N  Ω, all (N;v;L) 2 CSN,a n da l li2Nn S 1
it holds that
γi(N;v;L)=γ i( Nn S 1;z;L
0):
This property states that to the players that are not in the lowest class an allocation
rule γ attributes the same payo in the class-reduced communication situation as in the
original situation.
Lemma 3.6 The Myerson value with weight system ! satises CC.
Proof: Let N  Ω be nite and (N;v;L) 2 CSN. From CE and HCI of the Myerson






i (S [ S1;v;L)=
X
i 2 S 1

!
i( S[S 1;v;L 1)=v
L( S 1) :
So, for every S  NnS1 it holds that z(S)=w ( S ). This means that we only have to





i( Nn S 1;w;L
0):
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 i
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i ( w )
= !
i ( w L 0
)= !
i( Nn S 1;w;L 0)= !
i( Nn S 1;z;L 0):
The third and the fth equality use the fact that for every S with i 2 S there exists
exactly one T  Sk and U [ k − 1
r =1Sr with S = T [U. Notice that it is possible for U to
be empty and that it is possible that T is equal to S. The fourth equality follows from
lemma 3.5 and the seventh equality follows from lemma 3.3.
2
Before we are able to characterize the Myerson values with weight systems we need
to prove one more lemma. This lemma states that for every communication situation,
where there are links only between players belonging to the lowest class, it holds that
a solution concept satisfying component eciency and class weighted fairness coincides
with a Myerson value with weight system ! for all players in this class.
Lemma 3.7 Let N  Ω, N nite, and (N;v;L) 2 CSN be a communication situation
with L f f i;jgji;j 2 S1g.L e tγbe a solution concept that satises CE and CWF with
weights . Then it holds that γ(N;v;L)= !( N;v;L) with ! =( ;).
Proof: A c c o r d i n gt ol e m m a3 . 1 , !satises CE and CWF with weights. Now, suppose
there exists a rule γ that satises CE and CWF with weights with γ 6= !.L e t( N;v;L)
be a communication situation with L f f i;jgji;j 2 S1g and a minimal number of
links such that γ(N;v;L) 6= !(N;v;L).
First let i 2 NnS1.S i n c eC i ( L )=f i git follows from component eciency that
γi(L)=v ( f i g )=
!
i( N;v;L):













Because ! also satises CWF and using the minimality of L we derive













i (L)) = i(γj(L) − !
j (L)):
This expression is valid for all directly connected pairs in S1. Using transitivity, we nd
that the same expression holds for every pair fs;tg in a communication component. So,
let C 2 S1=L, i 2 C and d(C): = 1
 i( γ i( L )− !




j (L)) = d(C):





















 jd ( C ) :
So, d(C) = 0 for every communication component C 2 S1=L.T h i sp r o v e st h a tγ i( L )=
 !
i( L ) for all i 2 S1. We conclude that γ(N;v;L)= !( N;v;L).
2
We can now characterize the Myerson value with weight systems.
Theorem 3.1 Myerson values with weight systems satisfy component eciency, class
weighted fairness, higher class independency and class consistency. Furthermore, if a
rule γ satises these four properties, then γ belongs to the class of Myerson values with
weight systems.
Proof: Lemmas 3.1, 3.2 and 3.6 show that all Myerson values with weight systems
satisfy CE, CWF, HCI and CC. Now, suppose γ is a rule that satises CE, CWF, HCI
and CC. Let  denote the weights for which γ satises CWF. Dene ! =( ;). We
will prove that γ = ! by contradiction. Suppose γ 6= !.L e t N Ω be nite and
let (N;v;L) 2 CSN be a communication situation with a minimal number of links
such that γ(N;v;L) 6= !(N;v;L). If L = ; then we nd from CE of γ and ! that
γ(N;v;L)= !( N;v;L). So, L 6= ;.L e tkdenote the highest class with a player that
forms a link, so
k := maxfr j9 s2S r;9 t2N:f s;tg2L g :
We will derive a contradiction by rst showing for every player i in a lower hierarchical
class than class k that γi(N;v;L)= !
i( N;v;L). Subsequently we will show the same
relation for every player i in a higher hierarchical class than class k and nally we will
show for every player i in class k that γi(N;v;L)= !
i( N;v;L).
13Consider a class Sr with r<k . There exists at least one link in L with at least one
of its end points in Sk. This means that this link is a member of L but not of Lr,s o
j L  rj<j L j .F r o m H C I o f γand ! and the minimality of L we conclude that for all
i 2 Sr
γi(L)=γ i( L  r)=
!
i( L  r)=
!
i( L ) :
Now consider a class Sr,w i t hr>k ,a n dap l a y e ri2S r. By denition of k player i is
not connected to any other player. Hence, it follows from component eciency that
γi(L)=v ( f i g )=
!
i( L ) :
Finally, we will consider class Sk. So, let player i 2 Sk.S i n c e γand ! satisfy class
consistency
γi(N;v;L)=γ i( Nn S 1;z;L 0)a n d !
i( N;v;L)= !
i( Nn S 1;z;L 0):
The class-reduced communication situation has only players in classes S2;:::;S m.W e
will denote (NnS1;z;L 0)b y( N 2;v2;L 2). Since we have removed the players in the lowest
class, this is a communication situation with m − 1 classes. Notice that (N2;L 2)h a s
only links between players of the lowest k − 1 classes.
We repeat this argument until player i is in the lowest class. This will be after
k −2 more steps, and we will denote this communication situation by (Nk;vk;L k). The
communication graph (Nk;L k) has only links between players in the lowest class. It now
follows from lemma 3.7 that
γi(Nk;vk;L k)= !
i( N k;vk;L k):
If we combine the results obtained so far we get




















We have now shown for all r 2f 1 ;:::;mgand all i 2 Sr that γi(N;v;L)= !
i( N;v;L).
Thus γ(N;v;L)= !( N;v;L).
2
In the appendix it is shown that the four properties in the characterization above are
logically independent.
144 An alternative axiomatic characterization
In this sectionwe will providean alternativeaxiomaticcharacterizationof Myersonvalues
with weight systems. In this characterization we use two properties that were used in the
rst characterization, component eciency and higher class independency. Furthermore
we introduce a third property, class weighted balanced contributions, a property inspired
by balanced contributions (Myerson (1980)). Class weighted balanced contributions is
stronger than class weighted fairness. We will show that if we replace class weighted
fairness by class weighted balanced contributions in the characterization of the Myerson
values with weight systems in section 3, we can drop the fourth axiom, class consistency.
In order to introduce the only new property in this section, class weighted balanced
contributions, we introduce the following reduced set of links:
L−i := ffj;kg2Lji62 fj;kgg:
This set of links is obtained from the original set of links by deleting the links in which
player i is involved.
Class weighted balanced contributions (CWBC) : There exist weights  =
(i)i2Ω such that for all nite N  Ω, all communication situations (N;v;L) 2







This property states that there exist weights such that in all communication situations
two players can inﬂict the same weighted loss upon each other by breaking all links in
which they are involved.
We will rst show that a Myerson value with a weight system satises class weight-
ed balanced contributions. After this we show that the class of Myerson values with
weight systems can be characterized by the properties component eciency, higher class
independency and class weighted balanced contributions.
Lemma 4.1 The Myerson value with weight system ! satises class weighted balanced
contributions.
Proof: Let N  Ω, N nite. Consider RN, the set of all permutations of N. Further-
more, we consider the set of permutations R  RN where for all k 2f 1 ;:::;m−1g
it holds that the players of class Sk precede those of Sk+1,s oR2R can be identied
with (R1;:::;R m)w h e r ef o ra l lk2f 1 ;:::;mgit holds that Rk is a permutation of Sk.
15Furthermore we dene the set of predecessors of a player according to permutation R by
PR R
i := fj 2 N : R−1(j)  R−1(i)g.
Let (N;v;L) 2 CSN, k 2f 1 ;:::;mg,a n di;j 2 Sk. According to Kalai and Samet













By using the notation Ri
(S): =f R2R jPR R
i = Sg and using the fact that ! is
















h(N;v;L(S)−i)+v( f i g )
3
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Since L(S)−i = L−i(S)a n d( L − j ( S ))−i =( L − i ( S ))−j we nd that the expression
between multiline brackets is symmetric in i and j.W ed e n o t et h i se x p r e s s i o nb yK ij(S),











P !( R ) K ji(S):
Kalai and Samet (1988) note that for all R 2 R there exist probability measures
P!
1 ;:::;P!








The claim in the appendix of Dutta, Nouweland and Tijs (1995) states that for all















16Using this and multiplying with the sum over all possible permutations of all other








with R−k =( R 1;:::;R k−1;R k+1;:::;R m)a n dR − S k = r 6 = kR S k the carthesian product
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We conclude that ! satises class weighted balanced contributions.
2
Note that class weighted balanced contributions implies class weighted fairness. This
follows easily by noting that for an allocation γ that satises class weighted balanced




γi(L) − γi(L−j) − [γi(Lnffi;jgg)− γi(L−j)]
i
=






where the second equality follows from class weighted balanced contributions of γ and
the notion that L−i =( L nffi;jgg)−i and L−j =( L nffi;jgg)−j.
The next theorem shows that if we replace class weighted fairness by class weighted
balanced contributions in the characterization of Myerson values with weight systems
in section 3, we do not need class consistency to characterize the Myerson values with
weight systems.
17Theorem 4.1 Myerson values with weight systems satisfy component eciency, higher
class independency and class weighted balanced contributions. Furthermore, if a rule γ
satises these three properties, then γ belongs to the class of Myerson values with weight
systems.
Proof : We have already shown that all Myerson values with weight systems satisfy
CE, HCI and CWBC. Now suppose γ is a rule that also satises these three properties.
Let  denote the weights for which γ satises CWBC. Dene ! =( ;).
Let N  Ω, N nite, (N;v) a cooperative game, k 2f 1 ;:::;mg,a n di2S k.D e n o t e
with Ci(Lk) the component in the graph (N;Lk) containing i. W ew i l lp r o v et h a t
γ i= !
i by induction to the number of players in jCi(Lk) \ Skj.






L( C i( L  k) n S k)=
X
j 2 C i( L  k) n S k
γ j( N;v;L);
since Ci(Lk)nfig is the union of a number of components in the graph (N;Lk−1).








It now follows directly that !
i (N;v;L)=γ i( N;v;L):
Suppose we have already proved that !
i (N;v;L)=γ i( N;v;L) for all (N;v;L)w i t h
j C i( L  k)\S kjl .L e t( N;v;L) 2 CSN be such that jCi(Lk) \Skj = l + 1. For nota-
tional convenience we denote Ci(Lk) \ Sk = f1;:::;l+1 g . In the following system of




γj(L)=v ( C i( L  k)) − v
L(Ci(Lk)nSk);







This system can be rewritten using the induction hypothesis as:
X
j2Ci(Lk)\Sk
γj(N;v;L)=v ( C i( L  k)) − v
L(Ci(Lk)nSk);






Since the system is determined by a square non-singular matrix we have that this system
has a unique solution. Since ! satises CE, HCI and CWBC it is a solution of this
system of equations. Consequently, γ = !.
2
In the appendix it is shown that the three properties in the characterization above
are logically independent.
Remark
Borm, Owen and Tijs (1992) introduced the position value for communication situations
without a hierarchical player partition. First they introduced the link game (L;vN)
which assigns to every A  L the corresponding value of the grand coalition, vN(A)=
P
C 2 N=Av(C). The link value assigns to every communication link the Shapley value of
the link game. The position value then equally splits the value of a link between the two
players who form the link.
It is possible to extend the position value to an allocation rule for communication
situations with a hierarchical player partition. The extended position value divides the
value of a link equally between the two players who form the link if they are in the same
class. Otherwise the value is attributed to the player who is in the higher class.
The extended position value can be characterized in a similar way to Borm et al.
(1992). The properties component eciency, additivity, and superﬂuous link proper-
ty used by Borm et al. (1992) in the characterization of the position value are used
unchanged in the characterization of the extended position value. Their fourth proper-
ty, link anonymity, needs to be generalized in a straightforward way. This generalized
property could be called class link anonymity .
Appendix
In this appendix we will prove the irredundancy of the properties used in the two char-
acterizations in this paper.
First we will show that the four properties that we used to characterize the Myerson
values with weight systems in theorem 3.1 are logically independent. We do this by
19providing for each of the four properties an example of an allocation rule that does not
satisfy this specic property, but that does satisfy the three remaining properties.
The irredundancy of component eciency follows immediately if we consider the
allocation rule that attributes zero to every player in every communication situation.
To prove the irredundancy of class weightedfairness we introduce a new allocation rule
. For all components in the reduced graph (S1;L 1) this rule divides equally the gain
of a component among the players of this component. When the lowest k−1 classes are
handled we determine for every player i in Sk the component of this player in the graph
(N;Lk). We will denote this component by Ci(Lk). The players in the intersection
of this component with class k divide equally the amount that results when the payo
attributed to the players in Ci(Lk)nSk is subtracted from the value of the component
Ci(Lk). In formula, for all nite N  Ω, all (N;v;L) 2 CSN,a l lk2f 1 ;:::;mg,a n d
all i 2 Sk
i(N;v;L): =
1
j C i( L  k)\S kj

v




Theorem A.1 The allocation rule  satises component eciency, higher class inde-
pendency and class consistency.
Proof: Let N  Ω be nite and (N;v) a cooperative game. Higher class indepen-
dency of  follows by noting that v(Ci(Lk)) = vLk(Ci(Lk)) and v(Ci(Lk)nSk)=
v L  k( C i ( L  k ) n S k ) for all (N;L), all k 2f 1 ;:::;mg,a n da l li2S k.
We will prove that  satises component eciency by induction. Let C be a compo-
nent of (N;L). If maxfk j C \ Sk 6= ;g =1 ,t h e n
X
i 2 C





( v ( C )−v ( ; )) = v(C):
Suppose we already proved for all components C with maxfk j C \ Sk 6= ;g  l that
P
i2C i(L)=v ( C ). Let (N;v;L) 2 CSN and C 2 N=L be such that maxfk j C \ Sk 6=




L( Cn S l +1):
By the induction hypothesis and the higher class independency of  it follows that
X
i2C
i(L)=v ( C ) − v
L ( C n S l +1)+
X
i 2 Cn S l +1
i(Ll)
= v(C) − v
L(CnSl+1)+v
L( Cn S l +1)
= v(C):
20We conclude that  satises component eciency.
To prove class consistency let i 2 Sk with k>1. Notice that vL(Ci(Lk)) =
vL(Ci(Lk) [ S1) − vL(S1nCi(Lk)), since the partition of Ci(Lk) [ S1 in Ci(Lk)a n d
S 1n C i( L  k) does not split up any component of (Ci(Lk) [ S1;L). Using this we nd
i(N;v;L)=
1
j C i ( L  k ) \ S k j
n
v

























L(Ci(Lk) [ S1) − v
L(S1)




j C i( L  k)\S kj















I nt h e f t he q u a l i t yw eu s ev L( S 1)=
P
i 2 S 1 i( S[S 1;v;L) for all S  NnS1.T h es i x t h
equality follows from lemma 3.3, the notion that (NnS1;w)a n d( N n S 1;z) coincide, and
the fact that Ci(Lk)nS1 = Ci((L0)k).
2
The following example shows that the allocation rule  does not coincide with any
Myerson value with a weight system and hence,  does not satisfy class weighted fairness.
Example A.1 Consider the communication situation (N;v;L) 2 CSN with N = S1 =
f1;2g , L = ff1;2gg and v = uf1g. We see from this that 1(N;v;L)= 2( N;v;L)=1
2
while for all ! =( ;(S1)) with  2 IR
2
++: !
1(N;v;L)=1a n d !
2( N;v;L)=0 .
2
We proceed by showing the irredundancy of class consistency. We introduce a class
of allocation rules that satisfy component eciency, class weighted fairness and higher
class independency, but not class consistency. For this, we determine for every player in
the highest class the component of this player when links between players in the highest
class are not considered. Further, we determine the dierence between the value of this
component in the situation using only links that are not within the highest class and the
value of the same component except the players in the highest class. This dierence is
then divided equally between the players of the intersection of this component with the
21highest class. The non-attributed values are then divided in the same way as a Myerson
value with a weight system.
To describe this value formally we need some more notation. Let
L<m := ffi;jgjf i;jg2L; fi;jg6 S mg





Now dene for all ! =( ;) with  2 IR
Ω
++ the following allocation rule. For all nite






i( N;v;L) ;i62 Sm
i + !
i (N;vL −vL<m;L) ;i2S m
:
The following theorem shows that ! satises component eciency, class weighted
fairness and higher class independency.
Theorem A.2 The allocation rule ! satises component eciency, class weighted fair-
ness and higher class independency.
Proof: Let N  Ω, N nite, and (N;v;L) 2 CSN. Higher class independency of !
follows immediatelyfrom the higher class independency of the Myerson value with weight
system !.
To prove class weighted fairness notice that L<m =( L nffi;jgg)<m for all fi;jgS m,
so it holds for all r 2 Sm that neither r nor vL−vL<m change as a result of the deletion
of link fi;jg. Hence class weighted fairness of ! follows from class weighted fairness of
the Myerson value with weight system !.
We still have to show that ! satises component eciency. Let C be a component
of the graph (N;L), so C 2 N=L,t h e ns i n c e
X
i 2 C \ S m
 i=v
L <m(C) − v
L<m(CnSm)=
X












i 2 C \ S m
 i +
X






















22where the third equality follows from the additivity of ! which follows from the addi-
tivity of !.






i 2 C \ S m
 !
i( N;v;L);






















so ! satises component eciency.
2
To prove that ! does not satisfy class consistency consider the following example.
Example A.2 Consider the communication situation (N;v;L) 2 CSN with N =
f1;2;3;4g , L = ff1;2g;f1;3g;f2;4gg and v =2 u f 2 ; 3 g. Further the partition in classes
is as follows: S1 = f1;2g and S2 = f3;4g.S i n c ev L=v L <m it follows that 3 = 4 =1








3(N;v;L)=2a n d !
4( N;v;L)=0 ;
we conlude that ! does not coincide with any Myerson value with weight system. Hence,
! does not satisfy class consistency.
2
Finally we will introduce a class of solution concepts that satisfy component eciency,
class weighted fairness and class consistency. Further we will show that these rules do
not satisfy higher class independency. Every rule in this class is based on a Myerson
value with a weight system. However, the values attibuted by the Myerson value with a
weight system to the players in the same class and the same component according to a
certain restricted graph associated with that class is now divided equally between these
players.
To describe this value formally dene L0 := L and L1;:::;L m are the sets of links as




k−1)k for all k 2f 1 ;:::;mg:
23Since the lowest class with a player that forms a link in Lk−1 is class k,t h es e tL 0 k
contains the links in the set Lk−1 except the links between two players in Sk.
Let ! =( ;) with  2 IR
Ω
++. Now dene the allocation rule !. For all nite N  Ω,











Theorem A.3 shows that this rule satises component eciency,class weightedfairness
and class consistency
Theorem A.3 The allocation rule ! satises component eciency, class weighted fair-
ness and class consistency.
Proof: Let N  Ω be nite, let (N;v;L) 2 CSN be a communication situation, and let
! =( ;) with  2 IR
Ω
++. First we will show that ! satises component eciency. Let
C 2 N=L be a communication component. Denote for k 2f 1 ;:::;mgthe intersection
of C with class k by Ck := C \ Sk. Further, we determine for all k 2f 1 ;:::;mgthe
partition of Ck in fC1
k;:::;C
m k
k gsuch that if i 2 Cl
k then Ci(L0k) \ Sk = Cl
k.


































































This proves that ! satises component eciency.
To prove class weighted fairness note that for all k 2f 1 ;:::;mgand all i;j 2 Sk
(L [f i;jg)
k−1 =( L [f i;jg)
>k−1 [ (L [f i;jg)
k−1
=( L




24Since fi;jg2((L [f i;jg)k−1)k it holds that
(L [f i;jg)





This implies that Ci(L0k)=C i((L[f i;jg)0k). Now, class weighted fairness of ! follows
from class weighted fairness of the Myerson value with weight system !





k − 1 n ( L
k − 1 )  k )
0 =( L
k − 1n ( L
k − 1)  k)
> 1[( L
k − 1n ( L
k − 1)  k)
 1
=( L
k − 1 n ( L
k − 1 )  k ) [;=L
0 k;
since k>1. Further it follows that
L0k = Lk−1n(Lk−1)k =( L 0) k − 1n ((L0)k−1)k =( L 0) 0 k.
We conclude that (L0k)0 =( L 0) 0 k. Since the Myerson value with weight systems satises















jC i(L 0k)\S kj
+ !
i(NnS 1;z;L 0)− !


















We conclude that ! satises class consistency.
2
The following example shows that the allocation rule ! is not equal to any My-
erson value with a weight system. This implies that ! does not satisfy higher class
independency.
Example A.3 Let (N;v;L) 2 CSN with player set N = f1;2;3g, characteristic func-
tion v = uf1g and the set of links L = ff1;3g;f2;3gg. Further let ! =( ;(f1;2g;f3g))
with  2 IR
N














We conclude that there does not exist any Myerson value with weight system that is
equal to !.
2
We conclude that the four properties used in Theorem 3.1 are irredundant.
To conclude this appendix, we will show that the three properties used in Theorem 4.1
are logically independent. The irredundancy of component eciency follows immediately
if we consider the allocation rule that attributes zero to every player in every commu-
nication situation. Since class weighted balanced contributions implies class weighted
fairness, the irredundancy of class weighted balanced contributions follows if we consider
the allocation rule  that we introduced to show the irredundancy of class weighted
fairness in the rst axiomatic characterization.
Now, we introduce an allocation rule that satises component eciency and class
weighted balanced contributions, but that does not satisfy higher class independency.
Before we can introduce this rule we need some more notations. We dene a weak order
−1 such that for all i;j 2 Ω, (i;j) 2 −1 if and only if (j;i) 2 . We will call −1
the reverse hierarchical order. Given a weight system ! =( ;) we introduce a weight
system ! := (;−1).
Now we dene for all ! =( ;) with  2 IR
Ω
++ an allocation rule ! as follows. For











From component eciency and class weighted balanced contributions of the Myerson
values with weight systems it follows that ! satises component eciency and class
weighted balanced contributions.
The following example shows that ! does not belong to the class of Myerson values
with weight systems.
Example A.4 Consider the commmunication situation (N;v;L) 2 CSN with N =
f1;2g, L = ff1;2gg and v = uf1;2g. Further the partition in classes is as follows:
S1 = f1g and S2 = f2g.S i n c e v L= v it follows immediately for all ! =( ;(S1;S 2))





















We conclude that ! does not coincide with any Myerson value with weight system, so
! does not satisfy higher class independency.
2
We conclude that the three properties used in Theorem 4.1 are logically independent.
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